multi: Build and doco updates for Go 1.19.

.github/workflows/go.yml

@@ -9,16 +9,16 @@ jobs:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     strategy:
       matrix:
-        go: [1.17, 1.18]
+        go: [1.18, 1.19]
     steps:
       - name: Set up Go
-        uses: actions/setup-go@f6164bd8c8acb4a71fb2791a8b6c4024ff038dab #v3.0.0
+        uses: actions/setup-go@84cbf8094393cdc5fe1fe1671ff2647332956b1a #v3.2.1
         with:
           go-version: ${{ matrix.go }}
       - name: Check out source
-        uses: actions/checkout@a12a3943b4bdde767164f792f33f40b04645d846 #v3.0.0
+        uses: actions/checkout@2541b1294d2704b0964813337f33b291d3f8596b #v3.0.2
       - name: Install Linters
-        run: "curl -sSfL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/golangci/golangci-lint/master/install.sh | sh -s -- -b $(go env GOPATH)/bin v1.45.2"
+        run: "curl -sSfL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/golangci/golangci-lint/master/install.sh | sh -s -- -b $(go env GOPATH)/bin v1.48.0"
       - name: Build
         run: go build ./...
       - name: Test

README.md

@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ https://decred.org/downloads/
 
 <details><summary><b>Install Dependencies</b></summary>
 
-- **Go 1.17 or 1.18**
+- **Go 1.18 or 1.19**
 
   Installation instructions can be found here: https://golang.org/doc/install.
   Ensure Go was installed properly and is a supported version:

dcrec/secp256k1/schnorr/doc.go

@@ -27,23 +27,23 @@ time of this writing.
 
 Some of the advantages over ECDSA include:
 
- * They are linear which makes them easier to aggregate and use in protocols that
-   build on them such as multi-party signatures, threshold signatures, adaptor
-   signatures, and blind signatures
- * They are provably secure with weaker assumptions than the best known security
-   proofs for ECDSA
-   *  Specifically Schnorr signatures are provably secure under SUF-CMA (Strong
-      Existential Unforgeability under Chosen Message Attack) in the ROM (Random
-      Oracle Model) which guarantees that as long as the hash function behaves
-      ideally, the only way to break Schnorr signatures is by solving the ECDLP
-      (Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem).
- * Their relatively straightforward and efficient aggregation properties make
-   them excellent for scalability and allow them to provide some nice privacy
-   characteristics
- * They support faster batch verification unlike the standardized version of
-   ECDSA signatures
-
-Custom Schnorr-based Signature Scheme
+  - They are linear which makes them easier to aggregate and use in protocols that
+    build on them such as multi-party signatures, threshold signatures, adaptor
+    signatures, and blind signatures
+  - They are provably secure with weaker assumptions than the best known security
+    proofs for ECDSA
+  - Specifically Schnorr signatures are provably secure under SUF-CMA (Strong
+    Existential Unforgeability under Chosen Message Attack) in the ROM (Random
+    Oracle Model) which guarantees that as long as the hash function behaves
+    ideally, the only way to break Schnorr signatures is by solving the ECDLP
+    (Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem).
+  - Their relatively straightforward and efficient aggregation properties make
+    them excellent for scalability and allow them to provide some nice privacy
+    characteristics
+  - They support faster batch verification unlike the standardized version of
+    ECDSA signatures
+
+# Custom Schnorr-based Signature Scheme
 
 As mentioned in the overview, the primary downside of Schnorr signatures for
 elliptic curves is that they are not standardized as well as ECDSA signatures